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Insuring Liability Risks
by Tom Baker

Recent dramatic increases in prices for medical liability insurance, directors and officers
insurance, and other lines of commercial liability insurance, together with the exit of some
insurers from those lines of business, has placed liability insurance on the public agenda. At
the same time, asbestos and environmental losses continue to mount under general liability
insurance policies sold long ago, when no one could have predicted the extent or cost of such
losses. In combination, these and other related events have raised serious concerns about the
insurability of liability risks and have prompted calls for dramatic efforts to roll back the
advance of liability law in the U.S. and Europe.
With this ‘‘crisis’’ as the background, this essay represents a preliminary effort to explore
insurance for liability risks, with the goal of articulating a framework that will guide more
systematic and empirical study. In the main part of this essay I describe a new conceptual
framework for analysing liability insurance risks. The framework helps explain why
predicting losses can be so difficult in the liability insurance context and why cycles in
insurance pricing are more extreme in liability insurance than in other lines of insurance.
Much of this difficulty is already understood to follow from the ‘‘long tail’’ or ‘‘duration
of liability’’ problem in liability insurance.1 The primary contribution of the new framework
is breaking apart what I will call ‘‘liability developments risk’’ for separate analysis,
facilitating a better understanding of when and why the duration of liability matters. In
concluding, I use a brief analysis of medical liability insurance to offer some observations on
insurability and to sound the call for systematic empirical research aimed at improving how
liability insurance institutions manage liability developments risk.

A conceptual framework for liability risks
Considering an insurance market (or market segment) as a whole, the risks assumed by
insurance arrangements can be classified for present purposes into the following four
categories: (1) ‘‘baseline risk’’, which is the existing risk of loss based on past experience,
assuming no change; (2) ‘‘developments risk’’, which is the risk relating to developments that
change the rate or cost of loss during the insured period; (3) ‘‘contract risk’’, which is the risk
 Connecticut Mutual Professor of Law, and Director, Insurance Law Center, University of Connecticut.
Thank you to Thomas O. Farrish for research assistance and to Douglas Kysar and Peter Siegelman for comments on
an earlier draft.
1
A ‘‘long tail’’refers to the potentially long period that elapses between the time the policy is priced and the time
that claims are paid. When there is a long tail the insurer cannot know the true cost of the coverage sold until many years
after selling it. See Harrington and Danzon (2000) at 291: ‘‘[t]he longer the duration of liability, the greater the risk that
unanticipated information about hazards or new legal standards will shift the distribution of loss for all outstanding
policies’’. On the other hand, ‘‘the long tail associated with liability claims may allow insurers time to respond gradually
to unexpected increases in costs, an option not available for catastrophe property losses’’. Ibid., at 292.
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relating to the drafting and interpretation of insurance policies; and (4) ‘‘financing risk’’,
which is the risk relating to changes in investment performance and the insurance pricing
cycle. Although my subject is liability insurance, this framework can be adapted for use in
analysing many forms of insurance. Figure 1 below depicts this framework in a simple table
form. Figure 2 ‘‘explodes’’ the framework to depicit the constituent parts that I will describe in
this essay. As Figure 2 suggests, the primary focus of this essay is liability developments risk
and the way that legal developments affect other aspects of liability developments risk.

Liability insurance risk
– Baseline liability risk
– Liability developments risk
– Financing risk
– Contract risk

Figure 1

Baseline risk
The baseline risk is the existing risk of loss based on past experience, assuming no
changes in the future. Typically, determining the baseline risk is problematic primarily for
new kinds of insurance coverage and for very low frequency, very high loss potential events
such as earthquakes. In well-established lines of insurance, the baseline risk is the simple
projection into the future of the claims history of the past. If the future could be counted on to
be just like the past, an insurer could turn a profit simply by pricing on the baseline risk (plus
an amount to cover expenses and profit) and employing underwriters to make sure that the risk
level of the insured pool matched that of the population upon which the baseline was
determined. But of course the future is never just like the past; it is this fact that makes
developments risk, financing risk, and contract risk so significant.

Liability developments risk
All types of insurance face ‘‘developments risk’’ of one sort or another. Life insurers
must plan for developments that affect mortality. Health insurers must plan for developments
in medical technology. Property insurers must plan for developments in building construction
techniques and weather patterns. Disability insurers must plan for developments in
occupational patterns, and so on. No other form of insurance faces as broad a range of
developments risk as liability insurance, however, because almost all the developments that
affect other kinds of insurance also affect liability insurance. This is because nearly any kind
of harm that can be covered by other kinds of insurance can also be the subject of a liability
action. In addition, liability insurance faces its own, unique developments risk.
For present purposes, liability developments risk can be classified into five categories:
injury developments risk, injury cost developments risk, standard of care developments risk,
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Liability insurance risk – a roadmap:
Baseline liability risk
Liability developments risk
Injury developments risk
Injury cost developments risk
Standard of care developments risk
Legal developments risk
Impact on:
Injury developments risk
» Deterrence effect
» Reporting effect
» Definition effect
Injury cost developments risk
» Cost shifting effect
» Cost creation effect
» Claiming cost effect
Standard of care developments risk
» Legal framework effect
» Dissemination effect
Claiming developments risk
Contract risk
Financing risk
Investment risk
Underwriting cycle timing risk
Figure 2

Liability developments risk
– Injury developments risk
– Injury cost developments risk
– Standard of care developments risk
– Legal developments risk
– Claiming developments risk
Figure 3

# 2004 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics.
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legal developments risk, and claiming developments risk. Of these, only standard of care
developments risk is unique to liability insurance, but the other four pose special problems in
the liability context.
Injury developments risk
Injury developments risk is the risk of developments that change the frequency or
magnitude of injuries that are subject to compensation through insurance. Most obviously,
these include developments in injury-causing activities, such as the introduction of a new
product or an increase in the sales of an existing product. All other things being equal, the
greater the rate of change in the underlying activity insured, the greater the injury
developments risk. For example, one reason why medical liability losses are more difficult
to predict than automobile liability losses is the comparatively rapid rate of change in medical
technology and practice.
Significantly, injury developments also include developments that affect the understanding of what an injury is. In the bodily injury context such developments include new
imaging or other diagnostic techniques or new psychological theories that, for example,
transform the ‘‘deviant’’ (e.g. ‘‘malingerers’’) into the ‘‘sick’’. In the property damage
context, these developments would include a new understanding of the dangerous properties
of a material commonly present in buildings, such as happened with asbestos and appears to
be happening at the moment with at least some forms of mold.
Concepts like ‘‘injury’’ or ‘‘harm’’ or ‘‘damage’’ or, indeed, almost any other insurance
trigger (except, perhaps, death), are not constants like the speed of light or the value of pi.
They have meanings that change over time in response to social circumstance. This socially
constructed nature makes these concepts much more interesting objects of study. At the same
time, however, it makes predicting the frequency and severity of almost all kinds of insurance
claims problematic. The objects under observation – the injuries that serve as the foundation
for claims – mutate over time in response to changes in any number of institutions that
produce, measure or otherwise have a meaningful connection with them.
All forms of insurance face the risk of developments that affect the frequency or
magnitude of the injuries for which they provide protection. Liability insurance is unique,
however, in the importance that legal institutions play in the social construction of those
injuries. This special role of legal institutions will be addressed in the legal developments risk
section below.
Injury costs developments risk
Injury cost developments risk is the risk of developments that affect the costs of injuries
that are subject to compensation through insurance. Some forms of insurance, such as life and
disability insurance, generally pay a fixed amount for injury and, thus, do not face injury cost
developments risk. Other forms of insurance, however, promise to cover specified types of
injury costs; changes in those costs will vary future claim payments from the baseline. For
example, health insurance commonly covers the costs of ‘‘medically necessary services’’, and
property insurance commonly covers the costs to ‘‘repair or replace’’damaged property. Not
surprisingly, changes in the cost of medical services are among the most significant
developments that affect health insurers, and changes in construction costs are among the
most significant developments that affect property insurers.
As presently offered in the insurance market, liability insurance differs fundamentally
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from other forms of insurance in the open-ended nature of the kinds of injury costs that it
covers. Liability insurance protects the policyholder from having to pay damages to a third
party. This means that any cost that can be included in a damage award is at least potentially
covered by liability insurance. Damage awards include almost any kind of cost that is covered
by any other form of insurance, plus kinds of injury costs that are not covered by any other
form of insurance presently available. Most notoriously, the injury costs that are covered only
by liability insurance include difficult-to-quantify losses such as pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life, and in some jurisdictions, punitive damages.2 The injury costs covered only
by liability insurance also include ‘‘out of pocket’’ losses for which there is not presently a
first-party insurance market, such as long-term rehabilitation and loss of income for partial
disability. As a result, the range of injury cost developments that can affect liability insurance
exceeds the range of cost developments that can affect other forms of insurance presently
available.

Standard of care developments risk
Standard of care developments risk is the risk of developments that affect the standard of
care that determines whether injuries are subject to compensation through a liability action.
Other leading forms of insurance, such as property, life, disability and health insurance, apply
whenever there is an injury of the designated kind, regardless of how or why the injury
occurred. In contrast, liability insurance only applies when an insured is legally liable for an
injury. Liability of the sort that is subject to liability insurance generally requires establishing
fault.3 As a result, liability insurance generally compensates only for injury that results from
‘‘unreasonable’’ behavior, which is to say, behavior that did not meet the accepted standard of
care for the activity in question.
Standards of care are not static. They advance with technological and social developments. The greater the rate of change in the range of activities that are covered by a given line
of insurance, the greater the standard of care developments risk in that line of insurance. Each
advance has the potential to sweep a new range of injuries into the liability insurance net.
There will always be people who do not adopt any new practice, and the injuries that result
from their failure to adopt the new practice will, at least theoretically, be compensable through
liability insurance.
In a sense, standard of care developments create liability claims, by affixing a new,
blameworthy label on injuries that formerly would have been regarded as blameless. For
example, introducing a new, life-saving drug could lead to more medical malpractice claims,
as the families of patients who did not receive the drug (and may or may not have died as a
result) begin to blame doctors who did not prescribe it. Perhaps ironically, the more lives that
the new drug saves, the more medical malpractice claims it could create (because the better
the drug works, the more successful medical malpractice claims based on the failure to
prescribe the drug will be).
2

See Baker (1998).
The range of true ‘‘strict’’ tort liability in U.S. law is small. Apart from manufacturing defects, even products
liability requires proof of fault (see Henderson, 2002). Despite early concerns, the strict liability approach adopted in
the environmental clean-up area has not been extended to other areas. Although there are forms of insurance that
insure against breaches of certain kinds of contracts (a truly ‘‘no fault’’ or ‘‘strict’’ form of liability), by convention
those forms of insurance, such as credit insurance and surety bonds, are not classified as liability insurance. Once
there is truly strict liability, there would no longer be standard of care development risk.
3
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Legal developments risk
The discussion so far has introduced three aspects of liability developments risk: injury
developments risk, injury costs developments risk, and standard of care developments risk.
These aspects of liability development risk follow from the nature of the legal liabilities that
are the subject of liability insurance. Liability generally requires an injury that is caused by a
breach of the standard of care; and the damages that are assessed for that liability ordinarily
are expected to cover the costs of injury. Thus, injury, injury cost, and standard of care
developments risk could easily be labeled as aspects of legal developments risk.
Nevertheless, I have chosen to use the term ‘‘liability developments risk’’ for the general
category and the term ‘‘legal developments risk’’ for a subcategory. In doing so I mean to draw
a distinction between the broad range of social developments that affect the frequency and
magnitude of liability insurance claims, on the one hand, and the aspects of those
developments for which legal institutions are the central actors, on the other. As we will
see, it can be difficult to draw a line between those aspects of liability developments that are
potentially attributable to legal developments and those that are not, but there is value to
attempting to draw the line nevertheless.
The legal developments that most affect liability insurance can be classified into three
main categories: those affecting the requirements for liability in a given range of activity
(‘‘liability rules’’), those affecting the type and amount of damages that are paid because of
liability (‘‘damages rules’’), and those affecting the procedures for asserting liability and
obtaining damages (‘‘procedural rules’’). To appreciate the full scope of legal developments
risks, it is helpful to remain conscious of that fact that legal institutions act, not only through
formal legal rules (‘‘law on the books’’), but also through ‘‘law in action’’. The concept of law
in action refers to behavior of legal actors that is sufficiently regular or systematic that it is
possible to say that this behavior ‘‘is’’ law for the people who are subject to it.

Legal developments risk
– Liability law developments
– Damages law developments
– Procedural law developments
Figure 4

An example of a formal liability rule is the comparative fault doctrine, according to
which parties are held responsible for an accident according to their proportionate fault. For
example, in a rear-end automobile collision, the driver in front, who slammed on the brakes
too quickly, and the driver in back, who was following too closely or reacted too slowly, would
each be responsible for the resulting harm according to their relative faults. An example of
liability law in action would be the common understanding among automobile insurance
adjusters that, in a simple two car rear-end collision, the party who hits the car from behind is
generally to be regarded as the (only) driver at fault. As this example suggests, many aspects
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of liability law in action are simplified, more easily administrable versions of liability law on
the books.4
An example of a formal damages rule is the rule that the plaintiff’s damages in an
ordinary negligence case are to be determined according to the harm to the plaintiff, without
regard to the wealth of the defendant. An example of damages law in action would be the
common practice in ordinary personal injury litigation in which defendants are permitted to
settle out of a case in return for payment of the limits of their liability insurance policies, even
when the value of the harm to the victim was much greater and even when the individuals have
additional assets.5 As this example suggests, not all aspects of liability law in action can be
explained as simpler versions of law on the books. Indeed, in this example the law in action
contradicts the law on the books (by taking into account the defendant’s assets in assessing the
plaintiff’s compensatory damages, and by treating insurance assets differently from other
assets).
An example of a formal procedural rule is the rule that allows a plaintiff to bring a single
legal claim against all the people who contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. An example of
procedural law in action is the general practice of filing separate legal claims when there is a
wealthy defendant with a lower degree of moral culpability. For example, in a case involving a
rape or shooting or other highly culpable act in a shopping mall or apartment buildings
plaintiffs prefer to bring a separate ‘‘premises liability’’ claim against the owner of the
premises, in order to de-emphasize the role of the (presumably judgment proof) rapist or
shooter.6
The effect of legal developments on liability developments risk
Because of the pervasive role of legal institutions in liability insurance practice, legal
developments affect each of the other aspects of liability developments risk.
Injury developments risk. Legal developments can affect injury developments in three
main ways. First, as economic theory suggests, increasing liability can decrease the level of
activities that cause injuries, and decreasing liability can increase the level of those activities,
as actors adjust their behavior to respond to the resulting incentives. Call this the deterrence
effect.
Second, legal developments can change claimants’ incentives to report injuries,
independent of how many injuries actually occur.7 Call this the reporting effect. Increasing
the compensation for an injury tends to increase the likelihood that the injury will be reported
and, conversely, decreasing the compensation tends to decrease the likelihood that the injury
will be reported.8 Reporting effects are not always so straightforward, however. For example,
the decision by a leading automobile insurance company in Connecticut to change the amount
of damages it would pay to settle minor impact, soft tissue claims (e.g. whiplash), reportedly

4

See Ross (1970). This is the classic study of liability law in action.
See Baker (2001). For an excellent and highly readable case study of medical malpractice litigation,
explaining this and many other aspects of law in action, see Werth (1998).
6
This ‘‘law in action’’ has been prevented in some jurisdictions by a rule allowing one defendant to bring
another defendant into the action. See, e.g. Bhinder v Sun Co., Inc., 263 Conn. 358, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). N.B. The
Bhinder rule subsequently was changed by statute in Connecticut. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572h(o).
7
Cf. Harrington and Danzon (2000) at 305 (noting that injury rates, as opposed to claim rates, are
‘‘unobservable’’).
8
See Butler and Worrall (1991).
5
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The impact of legal developments
– On injury developments
» Deterrence effect
» Reporting effect
» Definition effect
– On injury cost developments
» Cost shifting effect
» Cost creation effect
» Claiming cost effect
– On standard of care developments
» Legal framework effect
» Dissemination effect
Figure 5
led plaintiffs’ lawyers to invest time and effort in understanding these injuries and the use of
new medical diagnostic tools. As a result, accidents that formerly would have been
understood to involve only soft tissue injuries, were now alleged to involve slipped or
herniated discs.9 This is an example of a reporting effect produced by a change in damages
law in action.
To a degree, deterrence and reporting effects can be offsetting. Increasing liability for
injury-causing activity tends to decrease the level of that activity, while simultaneously
increasing the likelihood that injuries are reported. Similarly, decreasing liability for injurycausing activity tends to increase the level of that activity, while simultaneously decreasing
the likelihood that injuries are reported. These offsetting effects complicate efforts to evaluate
the deterrent effect of liability and explain why some researchers focus their efforts on fatal
injuries (in the belief that fatalities are less likely than other injuries to be affected by the
reporting effect).10
Despite the potential for the deterrence and reporting effects to be offsetting, legal
developments seem likely to produce reporting effects more quickly than deterrence effects,
particularly when the legal development relates to ongoing activity. Unless the harmful
product or activity is immediately withdrawn from the market and from use, there will be a lag
between a new liability and a reduction in injuries, while new lawsuits for existing injuries can
be filed almost immediately. Similarly, it takes time for the elimination of liability to spur
production and increase injury, while the elimination of liability would produce an immediate
and dramatic reduction in litigation. Thus, in the short term at least, the apparent impact of a
legal development affecting an ongoing activity may well be exactly the opposite of that
predicted by deterrence theory, with the result that legal developments that make the world

9
Personal communication, Thomas Farrish, former Safeco Claim Analyst, July 2003 (expressing the belief
that many of these claims were fraudulent and exploited the high rate of false positives on MRI films).
10
See e.g. Loughran (2001).
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safer for consumers place financial stress on liability insurers, and legal developments that
provide financial relief to liability insurers tend to make the world less safe for consumers.
Legal developments also can affect what we understand to be an injury. Call this the
injury creation effect. Ordinarily we might think of the definition of injury as being within the
competence of the medical and allied professions (in the bodily injury context) or engineers
(in the property damage context), but liability actions require courts to make decisions about
the existence of injuries, sometimes long before scientists or engineers have reached a
consensus. Regardless whether science eventually agrees, those decisions ‘‘create’’ injuries.
Silicon breast implant litigation provides a dramatic, if cautionary, example. Before the
litigation, silicon breast implant surgery was understood as a medical procedure. The
litigation, however, framed this surgery, or at the very least the resulting presence of the
implants in the body, as an injury.11 Although subsequent medical research suggests that
silicon breast implants in fact do not cause injuries of the sort claimed in the class action,12
thousands of women in fact were compensated for this ‘‘bodily injury’’.
A related injury creation effect occurs when legal entrepreneurs link a health problem or
issue with legally actionable behavior and identify the problem as a harm that can be
monetized for the purpose of assessing damages. Fear of cancer and related medical
monitoring costs incurred by individuals with minor, non-impairing asbestos injuries surely
are the most expensive example of this phenomenon in recent years. This legal development
‘‘created’’ an enormous number of injuries, as people with no functional impairment and who
are aware only that they have been exposed to asbestos are tested to determine whether they
have developed scars on their lungs.13 Of course, this legal development did not cause the
scars to be there in the first place, but it did determine whether, or at the very least when,
people learned of their existence.
Injury cost developments risk. Legal developments also can lead to injury cost
developments. Legal developments can shift existing injury costs to (or away from)
defendants, thereby bringing those costs into (or out of) the liability insurance pool. Call
this the injury cost-shifting effect. Almost any liability law development can shift costs.
Indeed, from an economic perspective, cost-shifting is the basic function of liability. Legal
developments shift costs not only when the scope of liability is expanded or contracted, but
also when there are changes in the kinds or proportion of injury costs that can be shifted in a
liability action. ‘‘Law on the books’’ examples of the latter include changes in the rules
affecting the relationship between liability insurance and other forms of insurance (e.g.
subrogation rules and the collateral source rule), as well as changes in the rules regarding
recovery for emotional injuries (e.g. the popular U.S.$ 250,000 cap on non-economic
damages). Law in action examples would include systematic changes in settlement or
litigation behavior, or in case screening procedures by contingent fee lawyers.14

11
The silicon breast implant insurance coverage litigation expressly addressed the question whether the
surgery itself was ‘‘bodily injury’’ within the meaning of the liability insurance policies of the manufacturers. The
court deferred to the jury decision that the injury occurred at the time of the implant. In re Silicon Implant Ins.
Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 416 (Minn. 2003).
12
Ibid.
13
See Carroll et al. (2002) at 23. See also, Norfolk & Western Railway v Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003).
14
For example, one explanation for the increase in average severity among medical malpractice claims over
the past ten years is that plaintiffs’ lawyers have become more focused on litigating more serious claims and more
systematic about weeding out smaller claims. According to some plaintiffs’ lawyers this change is a reaction to the
1980s tort reforms.
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In addition to shifting injury costs, legal developments can also create (or eliminate)
injury costs, by affecting what people do to recover from injury. Call this the injury cost
creation (elimination) effect. For example, some jurisdictions in the U.S. experimented in the
mid-20th century with hybrid fault/no-fault automobile liability statutes. Under these statutes
people with less serious injuries could only be compensated by their own automobile
insurance companies on a ‘‘no-fault’’ basis (and were prohibited from bringing a tort action),
while people with serious injuries had the option of bringing a tort action against the
responsible driver. In those states in which the seriousness of the injury was determined
according to the dollar value of medical expenses incurred because of the injury, people
injured in automobile accidents increased the frequency and intensity of their medical
treatments in order to get over the threshold. In part as a result, automobile insurance
premiums in these states increased rather than decreased. Eventually, these ‘‘dollar threshold’’ no-fault statutes were repealed in some states. These repeals were directed at the
elimination of compensation costs that were attributable to the incentives created by the dollar
threshold.15
Legal developments also can increase or decrease claiming costs. Call this the claiming
cost effect. Developments that decrease claiming costs facilitate cost-shifting and, in an
important sense, reduce injury costs, while developments that increase claiming costs inhibit
cost-shifting and increase injury costs. Properly understood, the true social cost of a legally
actionable injury includes the claiming costs involved in shifting that cost to the legally
responsible party. Developments that reduce claiming costs to the point where the injury costshifting becomes possible (such as class action innovations) therefore reduce the costs of
injury, even if those developments increase the price of liability insurance by increasing the
share of injury costs shifted from victims to liability insurers. Similarly, developments that
increase claiming costs to the point where they inhibit cost-shifting increase the costs of
injury even though those developments might well decrease the price of liability insurance.
Standard of care developments risk. Finally, legal developments also can lead to standard
of care developments. Occasionally, there are developments in the basic legal framework
governing the determination of the standard of care. Examples include the shift from the
community standard of care to a national standard of care in medical malpractice and the
changes in the standard of care for products liability adopted in Second Restatement of Torts.16
On the whole, however, the legal rules governing the determination of the standard of care,
such as the requirement in ordinary negligence actions that the behavior must be ‘‘reasonable’’, tend to be relatively stable over the time periods that matter to liability insurers.17
The more significant effect that legal developments have on standards of care lies not in
the occasional change in the broad legal framework, but rather in disseminating advances in
the standards of care that were developed by actors, outside of courts, in the relevant field of
action. Here, we can think of legal institutions as accelerating the rate of change, as actors
adopt new techniques and procedures to avoid liability. One illustration of the potential effect
of this kind of legal development on the standard of care comes from a recent paper written by
members of the Harvard School of Public Health medical malpractice research team (Mello
15
Loughran, Note 11 above, at 7. For a discussion of reasons for repeal, see e.g. Connecticut General
Assembly, 1993. For effects of the repeal see e.g. Carroll and Abrahamse (2001).
16
See Sheeley v Memorial Hospital, 710 A.2d 161 (R.I. 1998) (rejecting locality rule in favor of national
standard); Restatement (Second) Torts } 402A (adopting a new approach to products liability).
17
This is yet another area in which asbestos may present a contrast case, because of the extremely long latency
period for asbestos injuries.
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et al., 2003). They caution the developers of the ‘‘leapfrog’’standards for medical safety to be
aware that the aspirational standards that they propose for hospitals may be used (misused, in
the researchers’ view) in medical malpractice litigation as mandatory minimum standards of
care. As this suggests, medical malpractice litigation can accelerate the dissemination of
advances in the standard of care.
Claiming developments risk
A final aspect of liability developments risk, claiming developments risk, is both
important and elusive. Given some existing propensity to claim, developments of the sort
discussed so far can be expected to affect claiming behavior in a fashion that bears some
relationship to how these developments affect the costs and benefits of claiming. Changes in
claiming behavior that result from these other developments would not be claiming
developments as I am using that term. ‘‘Claiming developments’’ are developments that
affect the propensity to claim, conceptually independent of other aspects of developments
risk.
All types of insurance face claiming developments risk. Fundamentally, this risk is
traceable to the fact that there never can be a perfect match between the population eligible for
insurance benefits and the population that makes a claim for the benefits. If all eligible people
always applied, and no ineligible person ever applied, the claiming rate would correlate
perfectly with the events that were insured against, and there would be no claiming
developments risk. But, there are always some eligible people who do not make claims,
and there are always some ineligible people who do. Changes in either direction lead future
claim costs to vary from the baseline.
There are many reasons why people who are eligible do not make an insurance claim.
Their lives may be in disorder. There may be stigma or other social costs associated with
making a claim, so that making a claim does not seem like an ordinary or usual thing to do.
They may choose not to interrupt their lives to do what is necessary to make a claim: a ‘‘sick’’
person may choose not to go to a doctor or a ‘‘disabled’’ person may prefer to keep working.
They may not know that they are eligible, either because they do not know about the insurance
or because the circumstances that trigger the right to the benefits may be ambiguous.
Similarly, there are many reasons why people who are not eligible do make an insurance
claim. They may mistakenly believe they are eligible, either because the circumstances that
trigger the right to the benefits are ambiguous or because they are poorly informed about the
requirements. In addition, some claimants may be aware that they are not eligible, but file a
claim nevertheless, in the hope that the insurer does not notice or else relaxes the eligibility
requirements in their case.18
These examples suggest the following regularities with regard to claiming developments
risk. The greater the stigma or other social costs associated with making a claim, the greater
the number of eligible people who will not claim and the smaller the number of ineligible
people who will claim. Conversely, the more ordinary or usual making a claim is understood
to be, in other words, the decision to claim depends on how people believe that others feel
about claiming. As a result, an increase in claiming may lead to a reduction in stigma, which
leads to more claiming, and so on. In addition, the more ambiguous the eligibility
18
The social meaning of such knowingly ‘‘excess’’ claims is a complicated topic that lies beyond the scope of
this essay. Insurers are likely to regard all such situations as fraudulent, but the subjective moral position of such
applicants can vary over a wide range. Cf. Stone (2002).
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requirements are, the more ineligible people will claim and the more eligible people will not.
Finally, the greater the economic need of the population in question, the more ineligible
people will claim and the fewer eligible people will not. Thus, changes in the social meaning
of claiming, changes in the precision of the criteria for, and the quality of the information
about, eligibility, and changes in general economic conditions, are all sources of claiming
developments risk.21 Further investigation is sure to identify additional sources.
Contract risk
Insurance involves the exchange of money for a promise. Because the insurer’s promise
will not (and cannot) be performed until the future, no one can be absolutely sure about the
precise meaning of that promise at the point of contract. Several features of insurance
arrangements exacerbate this ‘‘contract risk’’. First, in most lines of insurance it is impossible
to articulate with precision the conditions that trigger the obligation of the insurer to pay a
claim. Insurance contracts use terms with commonsensical meanings like ‘‘property
damage’’, ‘‘bodily injury’’, ‘‘medically necessary services’’, and ‘‘disability’’ that, as insurers
have learned from experience, can be imprecise at the point of claim. Even if insurers were to
replace broad, commonsense triggers with detailed descriptions of specific claim situations,
they would regularly confront claims situations that are difficult, if not impossible, to predict
in advance, placing stress on the application of the contract language. Second, in most lines of
insurance, managing moral hazard requires insurers to draft exclusions to the coverage that is
provided.19 The combination of a broad grant of coverage and a series of exclusions crafted to
manage moral hazard provides fertile ground for differences of opinion over contract
meaning. Third, there is a tension between the sales and claims functions of insurance
organizations that tends toward a broadening of the insurance promise at the point of sale and
a narrowing at the point of claim. As a result, there are (at least) two sets of images and
discourse that parties and courts can access when determining whether a claim is covered.20
Finally, the societal interest in compensation contributes to uncertainty in the application of
insurance contract language.
All other things being equal, this ‘‘contract risk’’ is proportional to the dimensions of the
conceptual space between the risks of a given type that are faced by the insured, on the one
hand, and the risks of that type that the insurance underwriter consciously intended to assume,
on the other. After all, it is the gap between harm and coverage that motivates the insured to use
the legal process to expand the insurer’s understanding of the promise. The greater the gap is,
the larger the motivation will be. In addition, the greater the rate of change in either the
activities insured or the terms of the insurance contract, the greater the contract risk. Change
in either the contract or the activities to which it applies means that there is no longer a settled
contextual meaning of the contract upon which the parties can rely.
Liability insurance does not appear to differ systematically from other forms of
insurance in most of these regards. Where liability insurance does differ, however, is in the
pressure exerted by the societal interest in compensation. This pressure follows from the fact
that, from a societal perspective, liability claimants are important beneficiaries of liability

19

See Heimer (1985). Cf. Baker (1996).
See generally, Baker (1994).
21
cf. Donahue and Siegelman (1991) (explaining increase in employment discrimination claims during the
period from 1970 to 1989 despite the apparent decline in discrimination).
20
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insurance contracts. It is liability insurance that makes liability law a risk-spreading system,
and a liability insurance contract does not spread risk unless it pays claims.22 Thus, liability
claimants are, in an important (but not necessarily formal legal) sense, third-party
beneficiaries of liability insurance contracts.
Other types of insurance contracts also regularly have third-party beneficiaries. But the
third-party beneficiaries of these other insurance contracts tend to have formal relationships
with the policyholder, typically contractual or familial (such as an employer, spouse or
parent). The existence of these formal relationships strengthens the equitable position of the
insurer seeking to strictly enforce the insurance contract. A contractual relationship between
the third-party beneficiary and the policyholder gives the beneficiary the possibility of control
over the policyholder’s choice of insurance contracts. And a familial relationship between the
beneficiary and the policyholder is typically (even if sometimes wrongly) understood to mean
that the policyholder is acting in the best interests of the beneficiary in selecting the insurance.
This possibility of control or apparent alignment of interest allows a strict construction of
these other insurance contracts to rest more easily on the bedrock of consent that remains so
important to contract law (cf. Kessler, 1993).
In contrast, the injured parties who are the beneficiaries of liability insurance contracts
only rarely are in a contractual or familial relationship with the policyholder and, thus, will not
be understood to have had the possibility of control or an alignment of interest. Thus, strict
construction of liability insurance contracts against the interests of these third-party
beneficiaries rests less easily on the bedrock of consent. As a result (all other things being
equal), liability insurers can be less confident about the meaning of their insurance contracts
in any particular context unless and until the contracts have been tested in litigation over the
meaning of the contract in that context.23 Changing either the contract or the context leads the
contract risk to reappear.
Financing risk
The discussion so far has focused on risks that affect the liability side of the insurance
business. To recap, the baseline risk is the risk of loss based on past experience, assuming no
change; developments risk is the risk of change in the rate or cost of loss during the insured
period; and contract risk is the risk that the definitive legal meaning given to the insurance
contract in the future will vary from that assumed by the insurer at the time of sale.
Insurers also face substantial risks on the asset side of their business. The category of
‘‘financing’’risk encompasses that asset-side risk. Two important aspects of financing risk are
investment risk and underwriting cycle timing risk. Undoubtedly, there are other asset-side
risks that I have overlooked.
Investment risk. Insurers receive money, today, in return for the promise to pay claims in
the future, and they invest that money in the meantime. This leads to investment risk, which is
22
It is commonplace for economic analysts to note that first-party insurance is a more efficient approach to
risk-spreading (i.e. compensation) than liability insurance and then to focus exclusively on the deterrence (cost
internalization) aspects of liability. See e.g. Shavell (2000) at 178. A realistic account of liability insurance, however,
must acknowledge that compensation is widely regarded as one of the primary goals of liability law.
23
The ‘‘all other things being equal’’ caveat should be taken seriously. For example, compare the uncertainty
faced in litigating one of the many relatively untested exclusions in a commercial property insurance policy with the
uncertainty faced in litigating standard liability insurance exclusions (which have been tested in countless court
cases).
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the risk related to changes in the value of, or income earned on, invested funds. Insurance
premiums are based, not only on the baseline risk and a projection of developments risk, but
also on projections regarding the value of assets in which the money is invested and the
income that is earned on those investments (as well as administrative costs, which this essay
otherwise ignores).
All other things being equal, the investment risk will be proportional to the amount of
assets under investment and the length of time between collecting premiums and paying
claims. As compared to many other forms of insurance, liability insurance requires insurers to
invest premiums for a longer period, thereby exposing them to greater investment risk.24
Property, health, and term life insurers make the vast majority of their claim payments within
12 months after the end of a one-year policy period;25 as long as these insurers match their
assets to their liabilities, they should have comparatively little investment risk. In contrast,
liability insurance claims tend to be slower to come in and slower to resolve, with the result
that there is a much longer time between collecting premiums and paying claims. This pattern
varies considerably among lines of liability insurance, with automobile liability insurance
claim payment patterns looking much more like property insurance claim payment patterns
than general liability or medical liability insurance.
Underwriting cycle timing risk. Partly as a consequence of cycles in investment returns,
and for other reasons that relate to the uncertainty that is inherent in taking money today to pay
claims in the future, there are cycles in the pricing of insurance, commonly referred to as
‘‘underwriting cycles’’ (Harrington and Niehaus, 2000; Cummins et al., 1991). During some
periods, competitive dynamics in the market lead insurers to charge premiums that are below
cost (the ‘‘soft’’ part of the cycle) and, during other periods, insurers are able to charge
premiums that are above cost (the ‘‘hard’’ part of the cycle). In the long run, premiums must
cover costs, but insurance policies typically are priced on a year-by-year basis, so that the
contracts sold in any particular year will involve an underwriting cycle timing risk. The
underwriting cycle timing risk is the risk that the price charged for the insurance will either be
above or below cost because of the ‘‘position’’ of the insurance underwriting cycle at the time
the insurance was sold.
The precise causes of insurance underwriting cycles are poorly understood. The leading
causes suggested by economists are interest rate cycles and capital shocks (e.g. catastrophe
losses), but it is generally acknowledged that these factors only partially explain the cycle and
that they provide better explanations for the ‘‘hard’’ part of the cycle than the ‘‘soft’’
(Harrington and Niehaus, 2000). Industry observers have tended to rely on behavioral
explanations such as herd behavior and the winner’s curse, which provide more complete (but
difficult to test) explanations for the cycle, and for the soft part of the cycle in particular
(Stewart, 1984; Fitzpatrick, 2003; cf. Harrington and Danzon, 1994).
The analysis of liability developments risk above lends credence to the behavioral
explanation. The forms of liability insurance with the most extreme underwriting cycles (e.g.
medical malpractice and products liability) are also those that face the greatest developments

24
For bonds held to maturity and matched to liabilities, the only investment risk will be insolvency risk. Other
assets cannot be matched as closely to liabilities. For these other assets, the longer the duration of liability, the greater
the investment risk.
25
The exception for property insurance policies are catastrophes, which require property insurance companies
to hold large reserves for infrequent, very expensive events. These reserves may explain the fact that property
insurance underwriting cycles are more severe than life and health insurance underwriting cycles. See Jaffee and
Russell (1997) for an illuminating discussion of why insurers may not hold adequate catastrophe reserves.
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risk and, thus, the greatest uncertainty at the time of sale about the ultimate costs of the
insurance. The greater the uncertainty, the more room there is for the behavioral pressures of
the underwriting cycle to influence assumptions about the future, hence the wider the swings
of that cycle.

Conclusion: liability insurance and insurability
As noted in the introduction, prior work has done much to explain the uncertainties of
liability insurance in terms of the duration of liability: the longer the duration of liability (the
longer the ‘‘tail’’ in the language of the trade), the longer the time between pricing the
insurance coverage and discovering what providing that coverage actually costs. Yet it is not
the duration of liability, per se, that creates the uncertainty. After all, life insurance contracts
have a much longer duration of liability than liability insurance contracts (apologies for the
double use, and meaning, of the word ‘‘liability’’ but I did not invent these terms), yet life
insurers tend not to worry very much about developments risk, in marked contrast to liability
insurers. On the other hand, life insurers tend to worry much more about investment risk than
liability insurers, because life insurers attempt to squeeze more competitive advantage out of
asset management.
As this suggests, extending the duration of liability does not create risks; it magnifies
them. A long duration of liability matters because it magnifies developments risk, contract
risk, and financing risk. A long duration of liability creates insurability problems only to the
extent that insurers lack confidence in their ability to manage those risks over that duration.
In discussing insurability, it is helpful to keep in mind the pragmatic observations of
Walter Karten in The Geneva Papers, who emphasized that ‘‘insurability knows no basic
formula’’ and ‘‘insuring risks is not a matter of general laws, [but] rather a problem of
deciding’’ (Karten, 1997, at 516). In other words, insurability cannot be determined by careful
application of neutral principles to objective facts (even assuming that there are such things),
because nothing is insurable unless and until there is an insurer willing to accept the risk at a
price that the entity bearing the risk is willing to pay. This does not mean that nothing useful
can be said about the conditions affecting insurability, simply that all such statements must be
regarded as provisional and that there is an unavoidably subjective element to insurability.
For liability insurance, it is only developments risk, and the magnification of the effects
of that risk through the underwriting cycle, that appears to raise significant insurability
concerns at present. While baseline risk, contract risk, and investment risk are, of course, very
important to an overall understanding of liability insurance arrangements, they do not pose a
threat to insurability. If the baseline risk is high, then the value of insurance is sure to be high,
and the only ‘‘insurability’’ problem is affordability. Demonstrating that contract risk does not
pose a threat to insurability is less straightforward, but aside from hyperbolic statements based
on a misunderstanding of insurance contract law,26 there does not appear to be concern about
26
See e.g. Karten (1997) at 521 (‘‘I doubt that any single insurer or association will ever succeed in wording
covenants that withstand [sic] before a U.S.-American jury’’). In the U.S. legal system, juries do not interpret
contracts, judges do. While U.S. judges are responsive to the contract risk factors addressed in the text, a careful
analysis of U.S. insurance law decisions reveals a picture that is inconsistent with the image of lawless, ad hoc and
reflexively pro-policyholder decision-making apparently held by some insurance company executives. See generally,
Baker (1994), especially at pp. 1416-1418 and notes 77 and 78.
While it is undeniably the case that U.S. judges, on very rare occasions, refuse to give effect to exclusionary
language in standard form insurance policies, those decisions almost invariably can be justified on the basis that
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the ability of insurers to manage contract risk.27 Contracts need to be priced to take account of
the contract risk factors addressed above; and continual attention must be paid to the treatment
of contract language by the courts. But for insurability purposes, we can set those issues aside.
Similarly, although investment risk is hardly irrelevant to the liability insurance business, I am
aware of no suggestions that it poses an insurability problem.28
What we find instead are suggestions that liability developments risk threaten the ability
of liability insurers to offer certain kinds of insurance, most notably in the U.S. at present,
medical liability insurance.29 According to some sources, claim costs are increasing so
rapidly and surprisingly that insurers lack confidence in their ability to price the risk (GAO,
2003). While claims of this sort are always subject to professional doubt,30 examining the
medical liability insurance situation helps illustrate the challenge posed by development risks
to liability insurance (and in the process shows how the framework developed in the main part
of this essay can be used to compare the risks posed in different fields of activity).
Medical liability developments risk
In considering the insurability of medical liability risks, it is worth asking ‘‘compared to
what?’’ A good place to start the comparison is automobile liability, the largest liability
insurance line in the U.S., and one that, absent extreme political interference in rate-setting,
seems not to pose insurability problems.
It is commonly and casually observed that medical liability insurance has a longer tail
(duration of liability) than automobile liability insurance and that this explains the difference
in the relative stability of auto insurance prices as compared to medical liability insurance.
That medical liability insurance has a longer tail is certainly true when medical liability
insurance is sold on an occurrence basis. Occurrence-based liability insurance coverage
generally provides protection against claims that arise out of harm that occurred during the
policy period, regardless of when a claim based on the harm is made. And the nature of
medical liability is such that insurers often to do not learn about claims until many years after

insurers sold the insurance policies in question in a manner that reasonably led consumers to believe that they would
have insurance to cover the risk in question: see e.g. C Fertilizer, Inc. v Allied Mutual Insurance, 227 N.W. 2d 169
(Iowa 1975). Alternatively, insurers may have led the insurance regulators that approved the form to believe that the
exclusion would not apply to the kind of claim in question: see e.g. Morton International v General Accident Ins. Co.
of America, 629 A.2d831 (N.J. 1993). These two cases represent the most extreme examples of ‘‘judicial activism’’ in
insurance contract interpretation in the U.S. In my view, both are correct decisions. Whether I am right or not,
however, a careful analysis of these cases and the far more numerous cases adopting a formal approach to insurance
contract interpretation should alleviate concerns about the ability of insurers to manage insurance contract risk.
27
Even in the asbestos arena, the problem for insurers was not contract risk. While insurers are understandably
disappointed with some of the asbestos insurance coverage decisions of the courts, these results are attributable in
large part to the fact that the insurance contracts were not drafted (or priced) with massive asbestos-type liabilities in
mind. Thus, it cannot be said that the courts have interpreted the contracts contrary to insurers’ intent, because the
insurers could have had no specific intent with regard to these unforeseen risks.
28
In a recent issue of Sigma, Swiss Re reports that no reinsurer has ever failed because of asset side risks (Swiss
Re, 2003).
29
See e.g. Swiss Re presentation at Geneva Assembly, June 2003; cf. Holsboer (1995) at 410.
30
See e.g. Faure (1995) at 459; see also Cane (1989).
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the harm began.31 In contrast, insurers almost always learn about automobile liability claims
relatively shortly after the harm.32 Thus, with the occurrence form of medical liability
insurance coverage, medical liability insurance has a longer duration than automobile
liability insurance (because of the longer delay between the policy period and the time claims
are made).33
The switch to the ‘‘claims-made’’ form of medical liability insurance eliminates this
difference, however.34 A claims-made policy provides coverage only for claims made during
the policy period, so all of the medical liability claims covered under a claims-made policy
must be made during the policy period. Thus, with a claims-made policy medical liability
insurance, the period between the time of the negligent act and the time of the resulting claim
no longer matters to the duration of liability. Yet automobile liability policies continue to
cover claims arising out of an automobile accident, regardless of when the claim is made, so
on that count at least automobile liability insurance would seem to have the longer duration of
liability.
There remains a crucial difference between automobile and medical liability claims that
cuts in the opposite direction. Most automobile liability claims are resolved relatively soon in
time after they are made, while most medical liability claims take several years or longer to
resolve.35 In large part this is because most auto liability claims are for relatively minor
injuries, with relatively small amounts of damages,36 and there appears to be a wellfunctioning system for settling those claims quickly. In addition, when the damages from an
automobile accident are very substantial, the relatively low automobile liability policy limits
purchased by many consumers means that the insurer pays the policy limit to the victim
relatively quickly (as compared to medical liability cases at least). Thus, in order for an
automobile liability claim to take very long to resolve, one of two conditions must hold. Either
there is a breakdown in the local understanding among insurance companies and personal
injury lawyers about the valuation of automobile injuries, or there is the combination of a
serious injury and a large automobile insurance policy. Medical liability claims, in contrast,
are almost never paid without litigation and are almost never brought by experienced lawyers

31
Reasons for this include the fact that some injuries do not become apparent until years after the acts that
caused them (which extends the period during which a claim legally can be brought) and that it can be very difficult to
find a lawyer willing to bring a medical malpractice action. This latter fact is contrary to industry lore; some of the
reasons why it is difficult to find a lawyer are explored in Werth (1998).
32
Because injuries from auto accidents are obvious, an automobile insurer can be completely certain that all of
the claims from a given policy year will be made within the number of years that corresponds to the statute of
limitations in the given jurisdiction, and experience suggests that most of the claims will be made within the first year
after the accident, in part because it is so easy to find a lawyer willing to bring an automobile case.
33
Recent insurance industry loss statistics illustrate this point. The industry estimates that it will ultimately
pay U.S. $ 51.2 billion to indemnify its policyholders from automobile accidents that occurred in 1998. Of that U.S.
$ 51.2 billion, U.S. $ 40.7 billion, or nearly 80 per cent, was settled and paid by the end of 2000. By contrast, the
industry settled and paid only 17.5 per cent of estimated liabilities from occurrence-based medical malpractice
policies over the same time period: A.M. Best (2001), at 232–243.
34
There remains a substantial amount of occurrence based medical liability coverage in the U.S. market (A.M.
Best, 2001, at 216). The following discussion applies only to claims-made coverage.
35
The insurance industry settled nearly 80 per cent of its 1998 automobile liabilities by the end of 2000: see
Note 32 above. It settled and paid only 51.5 per cent of its claims-made medical malpractice liabilities in the same
period (A.M. Best, 2001, at 232–243).
36
In 1996 the insurance industry paid U.S. $ 45.1 billion to settle 13.8 million private passenger automobile
claims – an average of only U.S. $ 3,478 per claim (A.M. Best, 2001, at 237). Many automobile liability insurance
claims are for property damage only.
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unless the injuries are substantial,37 with the result that the average time between making a
claim and making a payment is much longer (see e.g. Werth, 1998).
On average, then, the duration of liability remains longer in medical liability insurance
than in auto liability insurance, even with the shift to claims-made medical liability insurance
coverage.38 But that difference disappears for larger automobile liability claims paid under
automobile insurance policies with higher limits. Indeed, for the most serious automobile
accident claims and the highest value policies, the duration of liability is likely to be longer for
automobile liability. Lawyers tend to delay filing suit in serious injury cases until they are able
to determine the full extent of permanent disability. This means that up to the full period of the
statute of limitations needs to be added to the period required to resolve the claim in order to
determine the duration of liability for serious automobile liability claims.
Yet there is no talk of ‘‘crisis’’ in high-limit auto liability insurance policies,39 apparently
because insurers are sufficiently confident of their ability to price auto liability developments
risk. Working through the liability developments risk framework helps explain why. The
comparatively stable automobile technology means low injury and standard of care
developments risk. The comparatively stable state of automobile accident law (both on the
books and in action) means low legal developments risk. And a mature and widespread
automobile claiming system means low claiming developments risk.
By contrast, medical technology and practice are advancing, creating significant injury
and standard of care developments risk. Medical liability law appears to be in the process of
changing in a number of directions, creating significant legal developments risk.40 And the
ratio between medical malpractice claims and medical malpractice incidents is so low,41 and
the future social norms about medical claiming so uncertain, that claiming developments risk
may well be the most significant aspect of liability developments risk of all.
The only aspect of liability developments risk that appears to be roughly similar for
medical liability and serious automobile liability claims is injury cost developments risk.
Although medical malpractice damage awards traditionally have been higher than automobile or products liability awards for similar injuries (Dewes et al., 1995, at 100), the current
debates over medical malpractice reform has not produced evidence that the gap is changing.
Moreover, there is no obvious reason for the gap to have increased.42 Yet, ironically, injury
costs development risk is the focus of efforts to address the rising cost of medical liability
insurance, namely the effort to enact a statutory cap on the amount of damages that can be
37
The median medical malpractice payment in 1996 was U.S. $ 72,500, more than 20 times greater than the
average automobile liability claim: Div. of Practitioner Databanks, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., National
Practitioner Databank Public Use Data File (March 2003), available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/publicdata.html.
38
See Note 35 above.
39
It is always difficult to prove a negative. If there were such a crisis it would affect personal lines umbrella
insurance policies first.
40
An example of a ‘‘law on the books’’ legal development is the partial erosion of the special rule in medical
malpractice cases in which the standard of care is determined only by reference to customary practices in the medical
field (Mello et al., 2003). An example of a ‘‘law in action’’ legal development is more effective case selection by
existing medical malpractice specialists (allegedly in response to the 1980s era tort reforms) which is one explanation
for the higher average size of settlements (discussion at roundtable sponsored by Insurance Law Center and The
Geneva Association at New York University Law School, August 2002). This latter development is almost certainly
going to draw other personal injury lawyers into the field.
41
See e.g. Weiler et al., 1993.
42
Given the other developments in the medical liability area and the continuing effects of the 1980s era tort
reforms, the increase in severity among medical malpractice claims is more plausibly explained by greater selectivity
among plaintiffs’ lawyers as well as medical price inflation.
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Auto vs. medical developments risk
• Auto liability developments risk
– Stable technology ⫽ low injury and standard of
care developments risk
– Stable acident law ⫽ low legal developments risk
– Mature claiming system ⫽ low claiming developments
risk
• Medical liability developments risk
– Advancing technology ⫽ high injury and standard of care
developments risk
– Evolving law (on books and in action) ⫽ high legal
developments risk
– Many injuries ⫹ few claims ⫹ evolving social norms ⫽
high claiming developments risk
Figure 6
awarded for pain and suffering (GAO, 2003). If pain and suffering damages really posed such
a threat to insurability, then there would be cost and availability problems in the high-limit
automobile liability insurance market as well. The situation calls to mind that of the
homeowner who, when asked why he was using a hammer to fix a leaking pipe, replied
‘‘That’s the only tool that I have’’.

A call for research
If liability insurers are to move beyond hitting leaking pipes with hammers, they need a
better understanding of liability developments risk and what they can do to manage that risk.
For that they need more research, particularly more research on liability law in action. Most
people associate legal research with an effort to discover what legal rule governs or should
govern a particular type of situation. Without denigrating that type of ‘‘law on the books’’
research, which remains very relevant to legal practice, there are other types of legal research
that are more relevant to insurers attempting to create and price liability and related types of
insurance. These other aspects of research are more directed at law in action. This ‘‘sociolegal’’ research attempts to describe tort and compensation as a social field, with less concern
about what tort law ought to be and more concern about the scope, extent and social meaning
of tort law as it exists in the world (e.g. Saks, 1992).
Some of the topics addressed in socio-legal research include:
•
•
•

why/when people claim: the process of naming, blaming and claiming;
tort litigation statistics: what we do and do not know about the extent of tort litigation;
study of tort institutions: how the norms and social structures of the personal injury bar
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•
•
•

shape tort litigation; likewise with regard to the norms and social structures of liability
insurance institutions;
econometric studies linking legal rules, accident rates, and claiming behavior; attempts to
measure the effects of changes in legal rules on behavior;
tort in media/popular culture: how tort law is portrayed in the media and popular culture
and how those portrayals feed back into approaches to claiming, settlement and litigation;
legal history: examining the development of liability institutions over time.

This research is highly relevant to understanding and predicting legal risk. Many people are
familiar with research on the U.S. civil justice system by RAND, at least some of which has
been funded by insurers.43 There is more research out there by people who, although they
might initially be suspicious of the insurance industry, would welcome support as long as it
was not conditioned on biasing their research. (If the goal is to study and predict legal
development risk, biasing the research would be counterproductive.)
While there are many potential obstacles to serious insurance industry support for sociolegal research, the most significant one may well be ideological. As a long-time observer of
the insurance industry, for most of that time from an outsider perspective (e.g. as a young
lawyer, my first insurance case was in the consolidated asbestos insurance coverage cases in
California, in which my firm represented a large U.S. manufacturer), I have come to the
conclusion that, with regard to legal developments risk, insurance industry leaders are blinded
to some degree by ideology.
Perhaps it is a case of over-identification with their clients, but there is a sense that the
insurance industry has a moral obligation, over and above its financial interest, to stand as a
bulwark against the ‘‘litigation explosion’’, the ‘‘compensation culture’’, and ‘‘consumerism’’
in general. I am left with the distinct impression that industry leaders believe that these trends
are to be resisted, not understood, and that to attempt to understand them is to affirm them.
Personally, I happen to disagree that these trends are entirely, or even largely,
unfortunate. I will not try to convince you here, but my basic reason turns on the need in a
market economy to have liability regimes that require organizations to internalize costs
(whether of deceptive sales practices by life insurance companies or defective products sold
by manufacturers with liability insurance policies). This is not to say that there are not some
excesses – breast implant litigation may be one – but liability can be a very healthy process of
holding people responsible.
Regardless of who is right about the moral and social merits of these trends, however,
they exist and they need to be understood. As the ongoing medical malpractice situation in the
U.S. has demonstrated, tort reform has not worked to eliminate or even dampen the liability
insurance underwriting cycle, and if established liability insurance companies walk away
from substantial risks, economic actors will find alternative ways to transfer those risks, which
is not in the long-term interests of existing liability insurers.
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